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Abstract
The paper investigates the empirical relevance of the negative financial
spillovers hypothesis according to which fiscal imbalances in one EMU mem-
ber country bid up the interest rate faced by all other participants in the
currency union. This idea questions the ability of financial markets to cor-
rectly price various types of risk now that the elimination of exchange rate
fluctuations and the rapid integration of national government bond markets
have made securities issued by different European governments closer sub-
stitutes. The paper takes an eclectic approach and tackles the issue from
different angles, reviewing historical episodes, testing the Ricardian equiva-
lence hypothesis in Europe as a whole and finally analyzing the impact of
domestic and foreign fiscal variables on European bond yields. Despite the
strong comovements displayed by European interest rates, empirical evidence
does not support the idea that fiscal variables are a key determinant of these
interrelations.
1 Introduction
The paper investigates the empirical relevance of negative financial spillovers among
EMU member countries. The integration of national government bond markets that
resulted from the inception of the euro and the consequent elimination of exchange
rate risk has rendered securities issued by different EMU governments closer substi-
tute. In a recent survey on financial integration in the euro area Baele, Ferrando,
∗I am grateful to Roberto Tamborini, Axel Leijonhufvud, Gabriella Berloffa, Christopher
Gilbert, Giuliana Passamani, seminar participants at Universita` di Trento and at the workshop
Lectures on Macroeconomic Governance in the EMU for helpful comments; Flavio Bazzana, Gior-
gio Cipriani, Gabriella Mazzalai and Enrico Salvetta helped me with the data. Most unfortunately,
none of them can be blamed for any remaining mistake.
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2Ho¨rdahl, Krylova, and Monnet (2004) show that in the last few years movements
in government bond yields are increasingly explained by the behavior of the bench-
mark bond. Out of finance jargon, one can interpret this as evidence of the fact that
security returns are now driven more by international factors and less by purely do-
mestic news. Building on this notion, the financial spillovers hypothesis questions
the ability of financial markets to correctly price risk and to discriminate among
different issuers. More in detail, this hypothesis postulates a link between the fiscal
imbalances run by each government in the euro zone and the borrowing costs faced
by all other countries participating in the currency area. Such an externality would
in turn entail a redistribution of costs through the common monetary policy and
result in crowding out of productive investments in economic systems where the
interest rate would otherwise be lower. The negative financial spillover hypothesis
is often regarded as one of the (few) theoretical foundations of the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP): yet, as it will become apparent below, economic theory does
not establish a clear cut link between fiscal variables and the rate of interest. More-
over, despite the fact that the issue remains an empirical question, the hypothesis
have been tested explicitly so far.
Beside the relevance for European economic policy —the recent debate about
the opportunity and the costs of having binding fiscal rules witnesses for that—
the topic is also interesting on purely academic ground as it rests on two broader
unresolved issues in modern macroeconomics: the impact of the fiscal stance on
interest rates and whether the latter are determined by stock or by flow variables.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 contextualizes the financial spillover
hypothesis in the recent debate over fiscal rules and the SGP. Section 3 shows that
economic theory offers little guidance as not only different models present different
implications, but the same model may lead to opposite conclusions when a single
assumption is modified. The paper then takes a step backward and section 4 analyzes
two episodes in recent past where spillovers from fiscal variables to bond yields may
have occurred, namely German unification and the Italian fiscal crisis of the early
1990s. Moving to more formal empirical analysis, section 5 investigates the impact of
a European wide fiscal indicator on the average yield on government bonds, section
6 while narrows the focus on a subset of EMU member countries and estimates the
effect of fiscal variables on domestic and foreign interest rates. Section 7 concludes.
2 Negative financial spillovers and the SGP
Recently the debate about the SGP has regained the center of the stage as late
developments of European policy-making, spurred by the current poor economic
performance of EMU member countries, questioned (again) the rationale of having
binding fiscal rules and opened the door to a more flexible implementation of the
provisions of the pact.
The whole process of European integration is based not only on the belief that
fiscal discipline is necessary for the correct functioning of a monetary union, but
also on the conviction that such discipline must be imposed onto member states
3from above (i.e. from European institutions). By joining a monetary union, in fact,
countries are thought to incur in a bias toward excessive deficit since the common
monetary policy —tailored to serve the ‘representative country’— redistributes costs
onto all economies, thus generating an incentive to free-ride (Afonso and Strauch
2004, p. 6). Moreover, easier access to international markets (granted by the EMU)
reduces the financial constraint on national governments and thus spurs fiscal lax-
ity. Three sets of mechanisms have been devised to limit this perverse outcome:
one aiming at furnishing the ECB with the highest degree of independence and
credibility, the second limiting the ability of governments to run fiscal deficits, the
third explicitly stating that no co-responsibility exists among member states with
respect to national debts (no-bail-out clause). Unfortunately, the emphasis on fiscal
restraint that has been characterizing European institutions appears nowadays to
damage the support for the European project. To gain some insight, assess the rel-
evance of the hypotheses formulated to support and rationalize the Pact and weight
pros and cons of such an institutional framework, it is useful to analyze the reasons
that lead to the creation of the SGP.
In the road toward the single currency, at the beginning of the 1990s, European
partner countries decided to give themselves a set of condition to fulfill before join-
ing the monetary union. This was done in order to make the monetary reform as
smooth at possible. As is well known, the famous criteria required countries willing
to join the European Monetary Union (EMU) to achieve a certain degree of con-
vergence in terms of inflation and interest rates; moreover, candidate countries were
committed to adopt measures of fiscal consolidation apt to assure low budget deficits
and decreasing debt burdens. On the basis of the criteria stated by the Maastricht
Treaty, in May 1998 the European Council admitted 11 countries to join the EMU.
The rationale behind these rules was to give a solid fiscal backing to the newly
established single currency, limit pressures to monetize fiscal imbalances onto the
European Central Bank (ECB), and give the latter a jump start in terms of anti-
inflationary credibility. The Maastricht Treaty, however, only served to judge poten-
tial entrants at one moment in time while having no power to restrain future fiscal
stances. Arguably, once admitted a government could start again cumulating fiscal
deficits, piling up public debt and so on an so forth. This prospect soon started
to spoil the sleep of many European policymakers, especially those facing not-too-
Euro-enthusiastic public opinions who feared to incur in a deadweight loss by leaving
their good, old, stable national currencies and joining an Euroclub populated also
by some monetary scoundrels.
The subsequent debate generated the SGP, which basically gives a permanent
status to the fiscal rules contained in the Maastricht Treaty. This agreement (which
in truth looks much more concerned with stability than with growth), establishes an
institutional framework whereby member countries are required to achieve balanced
or surplus budgets on average over the business cycle, while imposing an upper limit
to deficits (no larger than 3% of GDP) in bad years. This cieling to the deficit/GDP
ratio is not binding in the (rather unlikely) event of a downturn in real GDP larger
than 2%.
4All the criticisms of the SGP directly or indirectly question its foundations and
the reasons that lead to its creation. Many of the contributions to the debate,
however, fail to distinguish between to separate issues: the need for a pact and the
rationale behind this pact.
In one of the contributions contained in the famous Delors Report (Lamfalussy
1989) the author suggests that default in one country may force other members to
intervene since part of the defaulted debt would be held by their citizens. How-
ever, even when no default occurs, in a deeply integrated market negative financial
spillovers can take place. In this case crowding out of more useful/profitable invest-
ments would result in countries where the interest rate would otherwise be lower.
The basic question is then whether markets are able to discriminate among different
issuers. Evidence from US states and Canadian provinces suggests this is indeed
the case (see, among others, Bayoumi, Goldstein, and Woglom (1993) and Cheung
(1996))1. On the other hand Thygesen (1999) reports that in the mid 1990s the
premium paid by Italian 10 years government bonds over German Bunds narrowed
to 30 basis points ahead of debt reduction.
Restoy (1996) claims that three conditions have to hold for markets to be efficient
in pricing risk: (i) free capital mobility, (ii) availability of complete and up-to-date
information about member countries’ public finance, (iii) credibility of the no-bail-
out clause. Bayoumi, Goldstein, and Woglom (1993) add a fourth condition, i.e.
(iv) resiliency of the financial system to potential failure of a large borrower.
Tamborini (2002) correctly points out that for fiscal rules to be sensible, one
needs to assume fiscal stimuli to be expansionary in the home country and contrac-
tionary abroad. Otherwise there is no incentive neither to run a budget deficit nor to
limit this ability. In his paper, there exist two separate channels through which pub-
lic spending in one country spills over. A trade channel linking domestic to foreign
aggregate demand and production, and a financial channel working via the impact
of budget deficits on the common interest and exchange rate. The strength of this
latter channel depends crucially on the elasticity of aggregate demand to changes
in the interest rate and on money/bond substitutability, i.e. the elasticity of money
demand to changes in the interest rate. When the latter is low, a larger movement
in the interest rate is required to accommodate the excess demand of money gener-
ated by increased production (in turn due to the fiscal expansion). Deeper financial
markets integration spurred by the introduction of the single currency should favor
money/bond substitutability and hence reduce the strength of this financial channel.
Artis and Winkler (1999) as well identify three ways through which an increase
in the interest rate can affect the real economy: crowding out of private investments,
appreciation of the exchange rate and consequent decrease of exports, contagion in
presence of a crisis. Buiter, Corsetti, and Roubini (1993) elaborate on this contagion
effect suggesting that to avoid a credit crunch the ECB would need to inject liquidity
into the system, thus raising inflation expectations. This in turn would severely
damage the goal of price stability. From an empirical point of view, this kind of
1The experience of New York State default in 1975 may have made American financial markets
efficient in controlling public borrowers.
5spillovers working through money demand and the common monetary policy of the
ECB should have an impact mainly on short-term rates, i.e. on monetary policy
instruments.
Kenen (1995) stresses an absorption effect that is more relevant to our work: by
issuing more debt, each country runs the risk of saturating the market by absorbing
a large share of European savings2. Such demand/supply imbalances would result
in a lower price (higher interest rate) for bonds. Again, this channel rests on the
assumption that markets do not fully discriminate among different issuers, i.e. that
a monetary union makes bonds of different countries (almost) perfect substitutes.
If this is not the case, this supply effect would be limited by the fact that securities
issued by different countries span different segments of the bond market; increased
supply of one bond, then, would only rise the interest rate paid in that particular
segment, with low or no repercussions on other ‘goods’. For this ‘loanable funds’
hypothesis to work we need an additional condition to hold, namely that after
the introduction of a single currency (and the subsequent elimination of exchange
rate risk) European financial markets are closely integrated so that different issuers
draw on a single pool of savings. At this point it is worth noting that according
to Hartman, Maddaloni, and Manganelli (2003) quantity based indicators show
that a significant home bias still remains in European portfolios. The resulting
segmentation in asset markets makes Kenen’s hypothesis about financial spillovers
less likely.
Fiscal events in one country should affect bond yields at the maturity for which
the new issue has occurred. Hence, if Italian deficit is financed by means of 10
years bonds, yields on long-term bonds for all other countries should go up. If
fiscal imbalances are covered by a mixture of debt instruments spanning the entire
maturity spectrum, then the entire yield curve should shift upwards.
The present discussion has placed the issue of negative financial spillovers within
the broader frame of the SGP and has shown that it represents one of the main
justifications for having binding fiscal rules. In the next section we will go beyond
this policy-oriented approach with the aim of investigating whether economic theory
offers any support to the idea that a loose fiscal stance in one country may push
upward the world rate of interest.
3 The theoretical background
The debate about the existence and the relevance of negative financial spillovers
rests on two broader theoretical issues in modern macroeconomics: whether fiscal
policy has any impact on interest rates and whether the latter are determined by
stock or flow variables. This section presents an overview of selected contributions
that —far from constituting a comprehensive review of the endless literature on
the aforementioned topics— serves the purpose of providing us with a theoretical
framework for subsequent analysis and with a context for our discussion.
2In practice only large enough countries are likely to produce this result.
6All models presented here (with the exeption of Branson (1988)) assume solvency
is not at stake: therefore changes in bond yields do not affect debt sustainability.
The reason for so doing is multifaced: first of all, default should be taken care of
by the no-bail-out clause and has in principle little to do with the SGP. On a more
practical ground, given current credit ratings the likelihood of default is extremely
limited for all EMU member countries3. Therefore we will not cover the part of the
literature that deals with debt repudiation and default and focus our attention on
negative financial spillovers in their narrow meaning, i.e. public spending resulting
in crowding out of private expenditure via its effect on the common interest rate.
Yet, addressing the effects of fiscal policy and public deficits postulating the
existence of intertemporal equilibrium (as most of the standard models do) is some-
how odd and introduces the issue of stability. Although this concept lies at the
very core of many macroeconomic models, it is most often given for granted and
therefore disregarded. If one traces the birth of macroeconomics down to Keynes in
the aftermath of the Great Depression, then we must agree in saying that at that
point stability was the issue. Keynes in fact envisages a world where substantial
and long-lasting deviations from the equilibrium are not only possible, but rather
frequent. The main message of the British economist is indeed that the system
—left to itself— may not be able to return to the equilibrium once a perturbation
has moved it from there. This belief informed economic theory (and a good deal
of policy-making) until the 50s and the 60s. With the emergence of the NAIRU
hypothesis and its acceptance, the idea that a stable equilibrium existed regained
momentum. In the last 30 years of so, in fact, economic theory has been giving for
granted the ability of the system to be virtually always at equilibrium. Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium models describe the economy as peaceful stroll along
the equilibrium path: from time to time small perturbations blur the picture, but
built-in adjustment mechanisms put the system back on track with almost no lag.
In this scenario, the role of any discretionary policy is at least questionable. Indeed,
in a perfectly self-regulating environment there can be very little to gain if a bunch
of government officials decide to mess with the machine in order to help it making
its way toward the equilibrium. Most modern macroeconomics requires stability,
i.e. that shocks to the optimal path are not going to force the economy further
and further from equilibrium. If, for instance, current budget deficits do not simply
usher higher future tax rates, but can lead to a debt crisis, then it is reasonable
to expect that interest rates will jump up (in contrast with the standard neoclassic
conclusion). Of course a debt crisis is not contemplated in this framework because
the government cannot violate its intertemporal budget constraint. At this point
we have done a full circle and are back from the beginning. Stability means that
the economy has some built-in deviation-counteracting mechanism driving it back
into the equilibrium path: once this is assumed, there is no need to consider the
occurrence of a crisis, simply because this option has been deleted from the model.
Hence the system is stable because there are no crises...
3Of course one needs to assume that credit ratings are a satisfactory indicator of default prob-
abilities: although this may appear arguable, we will run the risk of maintaining this assumption.
7We don’t want to push the argument too far. For our purposes it suffices to note
that the existence of intertemporal equilibrium is conditional on the stability of the
economic system. This seems to be an appropriate description of the European
scenario, so that this hypothesis is not necessarily at odd with reality. The evidence
put forward by Flandreau, Le Cacheaux, and Zumer (1998), for instance, suggests
the presence of nonlinearities in market discipline: debtors are not going to feel any
constraints on them unless they start stockpiling debt. In a sense we can say that
stability, i.e. the ability to get back on track, is assumed by market participants
for small deviations from the equilibrium. Once this boundary has been reached,
it may well be that the same mechanisms work in the opposite direction and drive
the system deeper into a crisis4. In addition to that, we can say that the closer
economic co-operation experienced by European countries and the adoption of a
single currency can grant more resiliency to the economic system, enlarging the
range of shocks for which the self-regulatory abilities of the economy work. In
what follows we are therefore going to disregard externalities generated by financial
crises and herding behavior. In sum, we have chosen to focus on spillover and not
on contagion effects and do so by assuming that the provisions of the SGP were
specifically designed to tackle the potential emergence of the former.
This section presents a taxonomy based on the distinction between models where
the stock of government debt matters and models emphasizing the role of flow
variables (budget deficits). We have chosen to concentrate on works that addressed
the role of fiscal policy in an open economy with a fixed exchange rate regime, as this
is the natural benchmark for EMU member countries. As it will become apparent,
not always clear cut result emerge and —as it is often the case in economics—
different model specifications lead to different results. Thus we will see under which
conditions does the theory predict fiscal policy to have international spillovers effects,
in particular by affecting the world interest rate.
3.1 Flow models
We open our review with the classic Mundell-Fleming5 (MF) framework that has
for long constituted the main workhorse of open economy macroeconomics. Despite
its several limitations, among which there are the lack of microfoundations and its
failure to distinguish among government consumption and investment (which makes
it ill suited to study the effects of fiscal policy (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996, p. 700)),
the MF model is still regarded as a benchmark reference among professionals and
academics. The MF framework postulates a simple income-expenditure keynesian
model with interest bearing public bonds, fixed prices and demand-determined out-
put. One consequence of the lack of any forward looking behavior is that no attention
is given to intertemporal budget constraints and therefore to sustainability issues:
hence there is no role for stock variables.
4This is the idea put forward by Leijonhufvud (1973) and labeled the ‘corridor’ hypothesis.
Unfortunately, the issues risen in that article have not received much attention in the last 30 years.
5See Mundell (1963), Mundell (1964) and Fleming (1962).
8As it is often the case for open economy macroeconomic models, a distinction is
drawn between the small country case and the full-fledged two-country model. The
former assumes an economic system too small to affect world markets, so that prices
and the interest rates are taken as given: fiscal policy then has no chance to impact
on the these variables. This feature of the small open economy is obviously not
peculiar to the MF framework but rather spans the whole literature, independently
of other basic assumptions: in the rest of the section therefore we will focus only on
two-country versions of all the models presented.
In the two-country MF model, a debt-financed increase in public spending bids
the interest rate up independently of the direction of output changes (which can be
positive or negative depending on the effect of the interest rate on world demand
for domestic and foreign products).
The second class of models consists of the neoclassical (intertemporal) ones6:
here a representative agent with infinite horizon and perfect foresight maximizes her
utility subject to a budget constraint. Perfect credit markets allow households to
borrow and lend at the same interest rate as the government, which in turn levies
lump-sum taxes and engages in public expenditures whose path is exogenously given.
Under this set of strict conditions the interest rate, investment and consumption are
invariant with respect to the way the government finances its expenditures: all that
matters is the present value of government spending7. This result easily translates
into an open economy framework: yet, while the irrelevance of the timing of taxes
does not depend on size, size does matter for the timing of public expenditure
Gt. Since the world economy cannot offset shifts of Gt toward, say, the present
by borrowing and lending (even though the present value of the infinite stream of
government spending does not change) such a shift will put upward pressure on the
interest rate as in the traditional keynesian model.
So far the government has not played any active role: by explicitly introducing
government spending as a choice variable subject to an intertemporal budget con-
straint, we can actually study the effect of fiscal policy. Frenkel and Razin (1992)
stress that there are two channels though which Gt influences the equilibrium of
the model: the absorption of resources that affects consumption and wealth, and
the consumption tilting that depends on the intra- and intertemporal complemen-
tarity/substitutability between public and private consumption. Assuming that Gt
enters the utility function separably, one gets an intertemporal marginal rate of sub-
stitution independent of government spending and therefore shuts the latter channel
6For a comprehensive analysis of the role of fiscal policy in the neoclassical model see Barro
(1989).
7Relaxing any of the basic assumptions, the predictions of the model change: ‘Ricardian equiv-
alence’ between debt and taxes ceases to hold and ‘traditional’ outcomes on the interest rate
emerge. For instance, by assuming finite horizons for households, one obtains that higher future
taxes will be levied partly after the death of currently living agents, so that government spending
has a wealth effect that increase present consumption, reduces saving and bids up the interest
rate (the Ricardian result continues to hold in presence of intergenerational altruism: hence, more
than finite horizons themselves, what matters is the degree of linkage across generations). Other
extensions account for imperfect credit markets where different groups face different interest rates,
uncertainty about future taxes and income streams and the presence of distortionary taxes.
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model setup: in case of a temporary increase in government spending the interest
rate goes up as there is an excess demand for current goods; on the other hand
a permanent shift in Gt may lead both to a lower and to a higher interest rate
depending on the marginal saving propensities of domestic versus foreign agents.
When we incorporate into the picture the distinction between tradable and non-
tradable goods, we get that the effects of government spending depend on two as-
pects: the intertemporal allocation of public versus private consumption and their
commodity composition. In particular, if public expenditures are biased toward
nontradables (as one would expect), the effects on the interest rate depend on the
marginal saving propensities of the government and households, plus on the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution of the latter.
Another way to break Ricardian equivalence is introduced by the third ‘family’
presented here: overlapping generation (OG) models a` la Diamond (1965) and Blan-
chard (1985). The presence of individuals characterized by a finite horizon together
with an infinitely lived society results in households using a different interest rate
than the government to discount future events: therefore budget deficits do have
a wealth effect. Frenkel and Razin (1992, chapter 11) present a two-period, two-
country OG model where a budget deficit results from a decrease in taxes holding
the path of Gt given. As anticipated, in this setup the timing of taxes does have
an effect on the world interest rate, but while current deficits undoubtedly push it
up, the impact of current and future deficits is less clear cut and depends on the
comparison between the public and private saving propensities.
By introducing a third period into the model the authors are able to study the
impact of a budget deficit on the term structure of interest rates. Their conclusions
show that as long as the present value of government spending is held constant,
expected future tax cuts increase the interest rate in the period of the deficit, while
the short term (current) rate of interest will be affected only if domestic and foreign
marginal saving propensities are different. Shifting now to the effect of changes in
government spending, transitory variation in current Gt bid up the interest rate
along the entire maturity spectrum, while in the case of both transitory and perma-
nent expected future changes, the direction of the interest rate shift depends once
again on marginal saving propensities.
The last part of this section is dedicated to the new standard model in open
economy macroeconomics, namely the Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) (OR) framework.
This is basically a sticky-price intertemporal model that combines keynesian fea-
tures into a fully microfounded framework based on utility maximization. In the
simplest case, government expenditure is considered pure waste (it affects neither
productivity nor private utility) and displays no home-bias. While a temporary
rise in Gt has no effect on the interest rate
8, a permanent rise in world government
spending actually reduces the short-term interest rates, thus reaching the opposite
8The reason is that output is demand determined: therefore an unanticipated temporary rise in
Gt results in a temporary rise in world output, with no effect on the amount of resource available
to the private sector. See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, chapter 10) for the details.
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conclusion as the older MF model. The authors however warn that different ways
to model public expenditure would lead to different predictions about the interest
rate. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), for instance, assume that government spending
enters households’ utility function and obtains the standard MF result whereby an
fiscal expansion (domestic or foreign) bids up the world interest rate.
3.2 Stock models
There are a number of models predicting an active role for the stock of government
debt: the first and foremost example that comes to mind is portfolio models where
asset demand for bonds results from the maximization of a utility function subject
to a wealth constraint. Tamborini (1997) provides an example referred to EMU
member countries: investors allocate their wealth among two bonds issued by dif-
ferent countries in order to maximize an exponential utility function with constant
absolute risk aversion. Despite the securities have symmetric statistical properties,
Tamborini (1997) shows that in presence of different stocks of outstanding debt, an
interest rate differential may develop as a result of the relative supply effect typical
of portfolio analysis. This kind of models, however, determine interest rate differ-
entials, not their absolute values and therefore are ill-suited to guide our empirical
analysis.
Branson (1988) addresses the shift in the external position that characterized
the US in the 1980s (and then Germany after unification): in so doing the author
presents a two-country ‘fundamental’ model in the keynesian tradition where the
domestic interest rate is determined via uncovered interest parity, adjusted by a
risk premium. The latter depends on the relative size of domestic to foreign debt
and so any fiscal deficit, by adding to the outstanding stock of debt, modifies the
risk premium and therefore the interest rate. Branson (1988) considers a floating
exchange rate regime and the impact of foreign deficits on the domestic interest rate
depends on the sensitivity of the current account to the exchange rate. As this would
be zero in the case of a monetary union, it is not clear whether the specification
would produce the same outcome with a different exchange rate regime.
Branson (1988) introduces for the first time default risk into the picture: when
that is taken into considerations, it is clear that the stock of debt matters. As
we have anticipated above, however, credit risk will not be considered here on the
ground that it is extremely unlikely that any European country defaults on its
debt and that unless a country nosedives into debt, markets will not impose severe
restrictions on its borrowing ability (including risk premia on bond yields)9. As it
will become apparent by the rest of this brief literature review, however, there exists
models in which default is not taken into consideration, yet the stock of debt does
play a role of some sort.
First of all, Barro (1989) notes that, in open economy, invariance of equilibrium
with respect of initial debt B0 vanishes if foreigners hold part of it. This is be-
cause foreigners are not subject to future taxes levied to pay-back initial debt and
9See for instance Flandreau, Le Cacheaux, and Zumer (1998).
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therefore debt represents a free lunch for them. A related issue is the so called
transfer problem: in a neoclassic intertemporal model initial debt positions (stocks)
may affect the equilibrium world interest rate if the two countries display different
marginal saving propensities. Yet this example holds the stock of initial world debt
fixed and deals just with a redistribution of shares, so there is no role for an active
policy.
In the two-country OG model presented in Frenkel and Razin (1992, chapter
11), higher levels of past public expenditure means a larger stock of initial debt for
the current generation. The result is reminiscent of the transfer problem and the
effect on the interest rate depends on the comparison between domestic and foreign
marginal propensity to save.
Within the OG framework, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, chapter 3) describe a
government that, starting from a zero net asset position, issues a give amount of
debt and distributes it to the current old. Current and future young are then subject
to taxes in order to keep the ratio of debt to the labor force constant. Savers must
now acquire government debt as well as productive capital, with the result that the
steady state capital stock will be lower (and the interest rate higher) than without
debt.
Leith and Wren-Lewis (2001) introduce an OG structure in a new keynesian open
economy model a` la Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). Since consumers are not infinitely
lived, the rate of interest is different from their rate of time preference and it will
be affected by the outstanding stock of government debt, which produces wealth
effects.
Our review of flow models ended by noting that different ways to model govern-
ment expenditure may lead to very different results. An interesting example is the
paper by Aoki and Leijonhufvud (1987) where the authors present a characteriza-
tion of investment whereby the return on capital (defined as the present value of the
income stream resulting from the investment) depends on the stock of capital inher-
ited from the past as well as on the rate of accumulation of new machinery. This is
because a higher rate of investment and a larger stock of capital generate an increase
of future production, which in turn implies an increase in future supply that is likely
to drive down prices and revenues with them. Of course, to adapt this model to
government consumption one needs to assume it (at least partly) to be constituted
of investment goods and that such goods are substitute rather than complements
to private investment. This represents a further example of how much modeling
choices can affect final results and hence the policy implications of economic theory.
We conclude this section by discussing one last channel through which stocks
may influence bond yields, namely liquidity. The marketability of a security in the
secondary market may in fact be an important determinantn of bond yields and one
expects diffusion to be closely related to the amount of outstanding assets. In a
more sophisticated fashion, Gravelle (1999) calls this the effective supply hypothe-
sis. Effective supply represents the amount of bonds in the hands of active market
participants, i.e. investors that do not buy securities to hold them to maturity (the
so called buy-and-hold investors). The author assumes a link between the stock of
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outstanding securities and liquidity via effective supply and trading activity. Em-
pirical evidence presented in the paper supports this intuition: in the case of US
government T-bills, in fact, turnover appears to be correlated with the outstanding
stock of assets. The paper goes on claiming that when liquidity is proxied by the
bond turnover ratio, there is evidence supporting the idea that
an increase in the size of the benchmark issue increases its liquidity
(Gravelle 1999, p.29).
To reconcile the opposed forces of absorption and liquidity, we have to assume
that while the negative impact on interest rates dominates in the case of the issuer
country (i.e. the fall of the interest rate due to a larger issue is larger than its
increase due to excess supply of bonds), the opposite holds for the foreign country.
In other words, while the saturation effect spills over to all economies drawing from
the same pool of savings (and so generates a generalized rise in interest rates), the
liquidity effect is a local phenomenon10.
4 Historical perspective
In our quest for financial spillovers it is useful to turn back to the past and analyze
some instances in recent European history when fiscal variables in one of the EMU
member states moved in significant way. By focusing on such large swings, and
by observing the concurrent movements in the yields on European bonds, we can
establish a sort of benchmark episode to which subsequent, more ordinary dynamics
can be compared.
Two events, in particular, will be considered here: German unification of 1990
and the Italian fiscal crisis of 1992. The two circumstances are of course neither of
the same magnitude nor of the same relevance: the former is undoubtedly a one-
time event whose consequences are not comparable to any other ordinary fiscal policy
action; in the latter case, on the contrary, we do not observe a particularly virulent
exogenous shock, but rather the sudden recognition that the Italian fiscal position
was set on an unsustainable path. This awareness resulted in a dramatic fiscal
tightening that generated the largest cut in public expenditure in Italian history,
allowed Italy to move towards the fulfillment of Maastricht criteria and hence granted
the country a seat among EMU ‘first wavers’.
Analysis of the two events should of course provide us with different indications:
the magnitude and persistence of the shock due to German unification is such that
strong negative financial spillovers are expected to emerge and hit all European
countries. In other words, if externalities exist this is one place where we trust them
to show up. For what concerns the Italian crisis, it is clear that Italian rates were
pushed up by the speculative attack on the lira of late 1992; the event did have
10Empirically, Cottarelli and Mecagni (1991) find that, during the 1970s and 80s, supply factors
seem more relevant than risk indicators in pushing up the interest rate on Italian public debt.
On the other hand, Codogno, Favero, and Missale (2003) conclude that international risk factors
dominate liquidity in determining the yield spreads among EMU bonds.
13
European-wide effects as it triggered a generalized realignment in EMS parities,
but the the weak fiscal position of Italy is a candidate explanation for the peculiar
movements of the Italian rates.
4.1 German unification
The purpose of this section is analyzing the international implications of German
unification from a European perspective. At the end of the 1980s German rep-
resented the third economy in the world and played a pivotal role in the process
of European integration. The European Monetary System had been established
a decade before (1979), was basically centered on the DM and was used by many
countries as a device to import monetary credibility from the Bundesbank ((Giavazzi
and Pagano 1988)). Sound macroeconomic fundamentals made the yield on German
long-term government bond the benchmark ‘safe’ asset for European investors.
For what concerns possible spillover effects, uncover interest parity (UIP) tells us
that an interest rate differentials is explained by expectations about future exchange
rate movements (or by country specific risk): in short we can write
it − i
∗
t = Et [e˙t+1] + ρ (1a)
where it and i
∗
t are the domestic and foreign interest rates, Et [e˙t+1] the expectation
about future movements in the exchange rate (price of foreign currency in terms
of domestic currency) and ρ is a country specific risk factor. Let us now take the
vantage point of Italian investors and observe some of the consequences of German
unification. Assuming that capital is freely mobile and that an increase in German
deficit and debt puts upward pressure to the domestic interest rate, one should
witness a capital flow from Italy to Germany, as Italian investors are attracted by
the higher interest rate paid on German bonds. We can further imagine that a risk
coefficient is attached to Italian government bonds, so that ρ is larger than zero.
Starting from an equilibrium characterized by a balanced CA, such financial flows
will put upward pressure on the exchange rate, calling for an appreciation of the
mark (and a consequent depreciation of the lira). Had this to actually occur, Italian
investors holding German securities would experience a capital gain generated by
the increased price of the foreign currency. To restore the equilibrium the Italian
interest rate not only has to reach German levels, but has to climb even further in
order to compensate the expected devaluation:
iitat = i
ger
t + Et [e˙t+1] + ρ. (1b)
This latter mechanism based on exchange rate expectation is obviously eliminated
by a currency union: hence, on purely theoretical ground once a single currency
circulates in different economic system, the chances for financial spillovers should
be —ceteris paribus— lower.
In the second part of the section we will describe the developments in German
public finances, external position and interest rates, while at the same time inves-
tigating the impact on interest rates of other European countries. The discussion
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is based on data from the IMF International Financial Statistics and the Deutsche
Bundesbank Time Series Database.
There is little doubt that German unification required a massive disbursement on
part of the Federal Government: although part of the required funds were collected
by rising taxed and cutting expenditures in other sectors, integration of new La¨nder
into market economy resulted in a surge of public deficit and debt. The Bundesbank
(1997, p. 18) claims that this was partly due to the fact that
not only was the fiscal policy challenge associated with this [the uni-
fication process] unforeseen, its magnitude was also underestimated at
first.
From the same source we learn that the ratio of debt to GDP jumped from under
42% in 1989 to over 60% in 1996 despite the positive impulse to production generated
by unification itself11; in fact while between 1991 and 1993 nominal GDP grew at
an average rate of 4.94%, in the following three years growth was ‘only’ 2.78%. The
same applies to the deficit to GDP ratio that, thanks to robust production growth,
never overcame the (in)famous 3% treshold imposed by the Maastricht Treaty12. To
get a feeling of the magnitude of the amount of resources drained by unification we
can look at few summary statistics: between 1985 and 1989 the average growth rate
of public debt was 5.88%, while the average deficit of the public sector amounted
to less then 20 DM billion; over the years 1990–1994 the stock of debt grew at an
average rate above 15% and excessive spending amounted to almost 60 DM billion
on average. Table 1 displays information about some key macroeconomic variables
before and after 1990: one important aspect that emerges clearly from the data is not
only the magnitude, but also the length of the fiscal effort required by unification.
As we can infer from columns (4) and (5) of table 1, financing needs were met
quite easily since foreign capital flew heavily into the country and kept coming for a
long time after unification. This was facilitated by the increase in bond yields and
by expectations about exchange rate dynamics (which would in fact be fulfilled in
September 1992 with the EMS crisis). A glance to figure 1 gives an immediate idea
of the dramatic turnaround in the external position of Germany: in the five years
following unification the country imported capital at an average rate of almost 30
billion of dollars per year, for a cumulated financial inflow of roughly 150 billion.
This stands in sharp contrast with what happened in the second half of the previous
decade when German investors had exported an average of 48 USD billion each year.
So far we have repeatedly claimed that the process of integrating East Germany
into Western standard implied an impressive and prolonged injection of resources
on part of the public sector. Moreover, BoP data suggest that Germany absorbed
11In terms of debt to GDP ratio Germany is not the worst performer among European countries:
in the same period, in fact, France and Italy display an even faster growth of debt relative to GDP.
The economic expansion triggered by unification, together with the poor economic performances
suffered by many European countries in the beginning of the 1990s can explain this apparent
oddity.
12The Maastricht Treaty was of course not in place at the time of German unification: reference
to its criteria is only made on a notional basis.
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resources from abroad and in particular from European countries that constituted
Germany main trading partners. Table 2 reports the ratios of the German deficit to
European GDP and to a European-wide stock of debt13. These figures provide us
with some information on the incidence of the German fiscal shock on continental
asset markets. While the deficit to GDP ratio has become a sort of benchmark
measure of fiscal imbalances, the outstanding stock of debt proxies for market depth
and should therefore indicate the ability of the market to absorb a give amount of
bonds. Of course we expect a larger impact to cause a lager movement in European
interest rates and hence, a larger negative financial spillover. To get a clearer picture
we can use the Maastricht criteria to compute the notional limits on the ratios
displayed in table 2. Using some elementary algebra we can write
deficitGer
debtEU
=
deficitGer
GDPGer
·
GDPGer
debtGer
·
debtGer
debtEU
and
deficitGer
GDPEU
=
deficitGer
GDPGer
·
GDPGer
GDPEU
where the first term on the right hand side of both equations is the deficit ceiling of
3%, GDPGer/debtGer is the inverse of the debt limit of 60%, for debtGer/debtEU and
GDPGer/GDPEU we use long-term averages of the German to European debt and
GDP, which for the period 1970–1995 are 19.41% and 31.67% respectively. In both
cases we obtain threshold values that are just below 1% (0.97 and 0.94%)14,15.
Let us now focus on the behavior of long-term interest rates in Germany and in
the other European countries. We expect the yield on German bonds to go up under
the pressure of the fiscal shock determined by unification. The first rows of table 3
show the monthly yield on long-term German bonds between 1 and 36 months before
and after unification: we take June 1990 —when the DM was formally introduced
in former DDR as the legal tender— as the origin of our imaginary time line. One
thing to notice is that unification come at the end of an expansionary period and
hence it contributed to overheat the economy: the Bundesbank raised interest rates
sharply in order to control domestic inflation (Dornbusch and Wolf 1992), and high
demand resulted full capacity utilization and spurred new investment. From the
table it emerges that German rates did not react immediately to the shock (one
month after unification the yield on long-term bond is 30bp lower than one month
before), but then the upswing is rather persistent: the average yield in the 18 months
that followed unification is 124bp higher than the average yield prevailing in the 18
months that preceded June 1990. These two facts suggest the presence of rigidities
13The latter variable includes data for the 11 countries that joined EMU in 1999; Ireland and
Portugal are excluded from the count of European debt due to data availability.
14These of course are not absolute values: since they depend on the relative weight of domestic
GDP and outstanding debt, they are country specific.
15A different measures of the flow impact of German unification can be found in Tamborini
(1997, table 3). It is given by the ratio of government net borrowing (GNB) to the sum of gross
private savings in the EU12 countries (GPS12) and measures the absorption of EU savings due to
each national borrowing need. German figures jump from 1.8% (1986–1990) to 4.2% (1991–1995).
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that may have hindered the adjustment and that unification was perceived as a
permanent rather than a transitory shock.
Turning now to the other European countries, the bottom part of table 3 reports
the yield on a weighted average of government bonds of European countries. Due
to data availability the basket of countries that constitute our European sample
is slightly different from previous analysis, where we used the first 11 countries to
join EMU, and takes into consideration also non EMU countries like Denmark and
the UK. Yields of different governments are weighted according to two different
criteria: nominal GDP and a measure of trade linkages with Germany (imports on
part of Germany). While the former represents a natural choice to determine the
importance of different economic systems in a European-wide context (Sinn (1996)
uses weights based on 1980 GDP figures), the latter method —giving more weight to
countries more closely linked to Germany— should produce a European rate more
prone to financial spillovers. What emerges from table 3 is that the European rate as
well reacted with a lag to the shock of unification, but this time the upward pressure
fades rapidly as the yield is back to pre-unification levels within 6 months from the
event. Different weighting methods do not result in any difference in the behavior
of the European rate. Figure 2 plots the difference between the the German and the
European yields over the years 1988–1992 and gives therefore a pictorial description
of the phenomena analyzed so far. Between June 1990 and Septembr 1992, when
speculators drove the lira and the pound out of the EMS, the spread shows a small
tendency to decline and only on the verge of the crisis does it jump back to the
levels of the beginning of the 1990s. A number of considerations can be made at
this stage: German unification occurred at a time when an expansionary phase was
ending: as a result interest rates were already high and the spread with respect to
German rates was reducing as investors privileged return over risk16.
To better understand the issue of spillovers from Germany to other European
countries we analyze spreads vis-a`-vis the German bond yield. As anticipated above,
the latter have been since long playing a pivotal role in the market for government
securities and most debt instruments issued by other European countries paid a
premium over it. Table 4 presents average yield spreads of selected European coun-
tries: we consider not only future EMU members, but also the UK (one of the EU
members that opted out of EMU) and Switzerland (which is neither member of the
EMU nor of the EU). We expect that looser linkages with Germany result in smaller
spillover effects. Their presence should provoke the spread to change only slightly
as an increase in the German rate is closely followed by an analogous movement
in foreign interest rates. In the limit, with a one-to-one spillover effect, the spread
should not change at all. On the contrary, if national economies are insulated from
external fiscal shocks, then the spread should decline (or increase, depending on
whether it is a positive or a negative spread) in response to the increase in German
rates caused by unification.
16It is a well known phenomenon in finance that in periods of recession there is a flight to quality:
and that risk affect yields proportionately rather than additively (see for instance Codogno, Favero,
and Missale (2003).
17
The picture that emerges from table 4 is not homogeneous for all the countries
examined. Grouping them according to the behavior of their spread we can say
that Belgium, Ireland, Spain and, to a lesser extent France, display a marked de-
cline of the premium paid over German rates. The same applies to Italy in the
early aftermath of unification, while later on the Italian spread moves up again in
response to the particularly weak fiscal position of the country, the latent fiscal cri-
sis that was mounting, and the speculative attack that hit the lira in September
1992. Luxembourg increased its margin over the German rate and 2 years after
unification its (negative) spread was still larger than the value of March 1990. This
is taken as a reference point in order to shield from the possibility that markets had
somehow anticipated unification and therefore bond yields prevailing one month be-
fore the formal introduction of the DM into former DDR are already uncommonly
high. Austrian spread became negative after unification, then it climbed back to
the values prevailing in March 1990, 3 month before unification. Dutch figures as
well underwent only minor shifts: yet two years after unification the German-Dutch
spread is nil, while 2 year before it amounted to 30bp. Portugal exhibits a puzzling
dynamic that pushed up the interest rate spread vis-a`-vis Germany; this tendency
is only reversed at longer horizons, but it is nevertheless difficult to reconcile it with
our analysis. Turning now to the UK, we again observe that the spread is sensibly
reduced, both in absolute terms (along the time line) and in comparison to average
values before German unification; the oddity here is represented by the fact that,
while the pound underwent in September 1992 a speculative attack that forced its
exit from the EMS, no sign of upward pressure on the British rates emerges from
the data, but this behavior can be rationalized by observing that having followed a
policy of high interest rates for more than two years (in order to comply with the
narrow fluctuation bands imposed on the pound by the EMS), the Bank of England
cut its discount rate in half as soon as it was driven out of the EMS. The marked
difference with respect to Italy may be justified by the stronger macroeconomic fun-
damentals that characterized the British economy at that time and that resulted
in the currency crises not to impact on long-term interest rates. The last country,
Switzerland, constitute a sort of ‘control group’: given its historical neutrality and
its peculiar role in international capital markets we expect German unification to
have no effects on Swiss yields. In fact the negative spread between the latter and
German ones became even larger and it takes 18 months to the spread to go back
to the levels observed 3 months before unification, testifying that the increase in
German rates did not produce any comparable movement in Swiss yields.
All in all, there seems not to be much evidence in support of the negative financial
spillovers hypothesis. While it is rather clear that the German rates were shifted up
by the fiscal shock due to unification, yield on long-term securities issued by other
European countries do not display any marked tendency toward an increase. Spreads
vis-a`-vis German rates declined for most countries considered. To support this
interpretation one can integrate exchange rate expectations into the picture and note
that in presence of an expected appreciation of the DM, not only should European
rates have moved upward, but they should have jumped higher than German ones as
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predicted by the UIP condition (1b). Hence in presence of an expected appreciation
of the DM financial spillovers would not be the only determinant of any upward
movement in other European interest rates. Despite a generalized consensus exists
on the fact that the EMS crisis of 1992 was not anticipated by the market 17,
the realignment proposed by Germany as early as 1989 and the flexibility (albeit
very limited) granted by EMS fluctuation bands suggest that the expected change
in exchange rates could not realistically be set at zero and thereafter the limited
upward movement of European rates is at least partially to be ascribed to exchange
rate movements, thus giving even less support to the spillover hypothesis.
Moreover, many authors (see for instance Rose and Svensson (1994), Sinn (1996)
and the references therein) claim that the EMS crisis that hit many European cur-
rencies in September 1992 was caused by German unification itself: in particular,
the upward swing in German rates and the consequent flow of financial resources
into the central European country called for a revaluation of the DM. Once France,
the UK and Italy opposed to the realignment in fear of undermining the credibility
of EMS (and the anti-inflationary credibility they were importing though it), real
appreciation of the DM had to arrive through price changes. The liberalization of
capital flows mandated by the Single European Act and implemented in most coun-
tries by the beginning of 1990 made impossible to reconcile fixed exchange rates
and independent monetary policies. Thus a conflict emerged between the Bundes-
bank commitment to control domestic inflationary pressures, the sluggish economic
performance of partner countries and their unwillingness to realign. This tension
opened the door to a speculative attack and hence to the crisis with the resulting
redefinition of central parities. This chain of events excludes any strong role for
spillover effects on European interest rates: had they occurred, in fact, the flow of
capital to Germany would have been limited, the need for revaluation not emerged
and EMS band would have likely granted the system enough flexibility to face the
shock. German unification is not the only culprit for the EMS crisis. In a classic
contribution of the topic, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) review four different ex-
planations, do not find a great deal of support for the view that unification played
a leading role, but nonetheless do present some evidence in this direction. Their
conclusion privileges the explanation based on self-fulfilling expectations but still
acknowledges that several other factors contributed in building-up favorable condi-
tions for speculators to succeed18.
An alternative explanation for the lack of financial spillovers is that the lat-
ter were ‘compressed’ by accommodating monetary policies in European countries,
unsustainable in light of the anti-inflationary stance pursued by the Bundesbank.
While it is certainly true that a conflict between Germany and other countries
emerged as the former economy was heating up under the stimulus of unification
17Rose and Svensson (1994) quote the behavior of interest rates —which did not jump up until
the onset of the crisis— to corroborate this view.
18Their table 3, for instance, presents the results of a survey of foreign exchange market par-
ticipants: apparently 68.4% of respondents maintained that high German interest rates were the
most important factor in determining realignment expectations.
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while Europe was sliding toward a recession, there seems to be little support for this
hypothesis. Figure 3 and 4 display the the percentage change in money and money
market rates for Germany, the UK and Italy. There is no evidence supporting the
view that the British and Italian authorities pursued a particularly loose monetary
policy in the period between German unification and the EMS crisis.
4.2 Italian fiscal crisis
The analysis of the Italian experience of the early nineties is complicated by the
fact that the (potential) fiscal crisis suffered by the country is intertwined with the
speculative attack that between September 16th and 17th forced the British pound
and the lira out of the EMS. Mainly for this reason, in this section we will use a non-
technical approach that exploits economic intuition rather than statistical inference;
despite the fact that our conclusions are therefore not corroborated by the bells and
whistles of econometrics and may appear not to be solidly grounded, we believe this
short parenthesis can provide us with some interesting information in our search for
financial spillovers.
In the present section we will review the development of Italian public finances
that led to a (potential) fiscal crisis that erupted at the beginning of the nineties,
almost in correspondence of the speculative attack on the EMS of September 1992.
Some sort of consensus exists in the profession on the notion that the crisis of 1992
was not driven by fundamentals: in fact, as Rose and Svensson (1994) show, short-
term interest rates remained fairly constant until late August and did not display the
sharp increase resulting from rising expectation of depreciation predicted by models
of currency crisis based on unsustainable BoP positions19. This observation gave rise
to another family of models20 in which multiple equilibria exists and expectations
play a major role in determining the crisis (Obstfeld 1996). While this kind of
models accommodate currency crises that hit countries with sound fundamentals
(as it was the case of the UK in 1992 and Mexico in 1994), it is important to note
that economic systems displaying weaker positions are more vulnerable also to crises
driven by ‘sunspot equilibria’: this is exactly what happened to Italy in September
1992.
Deterioration of Italian public finances begun in the 1970s as a consequence of
the oil shocks that severely hit an economy traditionally dependent on oil imports.
Public expenditures quickly showed a large degree of hysteresis and governments
were not able (or not willing) to adjust them when the international situation im-
proved. Thus the debt-to-GDP ratio grew from 34% in 1970 to almost 50% in 1975
and 55% in 1980, despite the fact that in the second half of the decade real GDP had
grown at an average rate of 4.46% and therefore there was presumibly little need to
sustain it. The same bahavior characterized the 1980s: relative to GDP, the stock of
debt grew to reach 95% in 1990, whith two-digit fiscal deficits occurring year after
year. To get a complete picture of the disastrous state of Italian public finances at
19The so-called first generation models a` la Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984).
20Labeled second generation models.
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the beginning of the nineties, it is useful to look at yet another indicator, namely the
ratio of interest rate payments over GDP. This represents the self-reinforcing part of
debt: since to higher levels of debt corresponds larger interest outlays, the primary
surplus needed to at least stabilize debt is greater and the this in turn increases the
risk to observe a vicious circle running from debt and interest payments to deficit
and hence debt. Had something of this sort to happen, then drastic measures need
to be taken, which can even result into debt consolidation or repudiation. Table
5 reports some widespread fiscal indicators for Italy: note that the amount of re-
sources devoted to pay interest on the outstanding stock of debt grew at an alarming
pace and at the beginning of the nineties seems to have taken an explosive path. In
fact, in the short time span ranging from 1990 to 1992 the debt-to-GDP ratio gained
other 10 points and the share of national GDP absorbed by interest outlays moved
from below 10% to above 12%, witnessing a critical situation that could easily go
out of hands21.
The response of long-term bond yield to the development of Italian public fi-
nances occurred in two stages: as the top-left panel of figure 5 shows, the Italian
interest rate jumped up a first time in the first quarter of 1991 —most probably
a reaction to the cumulative deterioration of that country’s fiscal position— and
then again in correspondence of the speculative attack. The very week that saw the
eruption of the currency crisis, the Italian government eventually adopted drastic
fiscal measures by passing budget cuts that amounted to nearly 100 trillion liras
(around 7% of 1992 nominal GDP, the largest budget cut in Italian history) and
taking a formal commitment to meet Maastricht criteria in time to join the EMU
together with the first group of countries. This timing prevented the situation to
get worse and made the interest rate increase short lived, allowing yields to take a
descending path that lasted until the beginning of 1994.
The other panels of figure 5 display bond yields for a selection of European
countries. The British and French rate do experience small increments around the
time of the crisis, but they are very small compared to the jump undergone by the
Italian rate and should mostly be attributed to exchange rates expectations22. In
fact both countries were experiencing a downward movement in interest rates before
the crisis: the speculative attack provoked only a small temporary pause in this
pattern, which quickly regained its pace afterward. Surely, sound public finances
did play a role in limiting the impact of the EMS crisis on bond yields by eliminating
the increase due to default risk (the main determinant of the different behavior of
Italian rates). The three bottom panels of 5 show the path followed by German,
Dutch and Austrian interest rates. While the first yield display a small increase at
the time of the crisis (we have to remember that Germany as well was characterized
by a fiscal position that was getting weaker as a result of unification), this had
almost no impact on the latter two countries23.
21In an interview given on February 25th, 1993 Mr. Ciampi —at that time Governor of the Bank
of Italy— stated that in Fall 1992 the country had been close to a financial collapse.
22Note that the scale of the Y-axis is different for different panels of figure5, hence visual com-
parison of interest rate levels may be misleading.
23Austria was not formally a member of the EMS but was rather pegging its currency to the
21
Overall, while the speculative attack of September 1992 did have European-wide
effects on interest rates by forcing a generalized realignment of fixed parities among
currencies participating to the EMS, no clue emerges of any negative spillover ac-
cruing from the fiscal crisis that hit Italy in the same period. While it is rather
difficult to disentangle the movements in bond yields due to expected devaluations
from those generated by fiscal fundamentals, it appears that the crisis had a larger
impact on countries characterized by weaker public finances. This behavior wit-
ness to the ability of markets to correctly discriminate among issuers and provide
some other evidence (though almost anecdotal) against a significant role of negative
financial spillovers.
5 Empirical analysis: aggregate behavior in the
euro area
Turning now to more formal empirical analysis, the search for potential spillovers
of fiscal policies on the European interest rate crosses with tests of the Ricardian
equivalence hypothesis that we have encountered in section 3.
One of the traditional channels identified in the literature for testing Ricar-
dian equivalence addresses the relation between fiscal deficits and interest rates24:
the amount of research devoted to the issue is extremely vast 25, though empirical
evidence is confused and gives mixed results. Recent examples of works reaching
opposite conclusions include Laubach (2003), Gale and Orszag (2003) and Kormendi
and Protopapadakis (2004).
Recently some authors have taken a slightly different route and have investigated
the impact of world fiscal variables on interest rates. The parallelism with the issue
of financial spillovers is straightforward. Indeed, Ford and Laxton (1999, pp.77-
78) explicitly claim that with globally integrated capital markets it is world debt
that matters for the determination of country-specific interest rates. Hence, they
continue, ‘countries with high levels of government debt may be imposing negative
externalities on others’. The fundamental hypothesis at work here is that a euro
cent of debt has the same impact on world markets regardless of the issuer. The
conclusion of the two authors is that the ratio of OECD public debt to world GDP
has had a substantial effect on the interest rates of nine industrial countries26 over
the period 1977-1997. Local developments, on the other hand, are only relevant
to explain persistent spreads, though their effect is not significant on interest rate
levels.
Breedon, Henry, and Williams (1999), who study G-3 economies over period
1975-1988 using ex-post 10 year real interest rates, present similar results even if
DM in an informal manner.
24Yet one has to recognize that it is possible to observe no correlation between fiscal variables
and interest rates for reasons that have little to do with Ricardian equivalence.
25Seater (1993) is often regarded as the main reference on the topic, though it is somehow dated.
26Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Switzerland, the UK and the
US
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they find a more relevant role for domestic factors that —they claim— are at least as
important as international ones. The three authors interpret their result as evidence
against financial markets integration.
Chinn and Frankel (2003) repeat the exercise investigating the impact of G7 debt
on the interest rates of Germany, France, Italy and Spain over the period 1988-2002,
but they find no significant effect.
Ardagna, Caselli, and Lane (2004) investigate the relation between fiscal vari-
ables and long-term interest rates using a panel of 16 OECD countries over the last
40 years. Their findings support the idea international factors are relevant (so that
negative financial spillovers do occur), yet to a much lesser extent than domestic
ones. Again, this evidence points toward a lack of integration in capital markets.
Closely related to our work is the finding by the authors that EMU does not consti-
tute a breakpoint for European countries: the introduction of the single currency in
fact seems not to have resulted in international variables to be more relevant and/or
domestic ones to loose importance in the determination of bond yields. In sum, this
recent work suggests that while there is an effect of international fiscal variables on
interest rates, the inception of EMU has not provoked any structural change in the
relation between deficit, debt and bond yields.
Following Chinn and Frankel (2003) we test the hypothesis that European capital
market can be considered as a single pool of funds from which all countries draw
and for which they all compete. Once confirmed by the data, this theory would
back the idea that by absorbing a significant share of European saving, the fiscal
imbalances in one country can affect the common interest rate and thus impose
negative externalities on economic partners. Yet, the budget limits incorporated
into the SGP are not aimed at limiting European-wide fiscal expansions, but rather
the behavior of single states. The relevant hypothesis is therefore more stringent
than the one tested here, where we check whether European imbalances have an
impact on the EMU-wide rate of interest. In other words a failure to reject our null
hypothesis does not immediately lend support to the existence of negative financial
spillovers as postulated in the SGP.
In this first empirical exercise we consider the euro area as a single economic
entity and look for a relation among aggregate measures of the fiscal stance and a
weighted average of different bond yields. We exploit two sets of data, both of which
report figures for the 12 EMU countries as a whole: first we use quarterly data on
the EMU published by OECD in its Economic Outlook for the period 1980q1 to
2004q2, then —in order to isolate the effect of EMU— we turn monthly data taken
form the ECB Monthly Bulletin that range from January 1999 to April 2004 27.
In the actual implementation of the analysis we follow the structure suggested
by Ardagna, Caselli, and Lane (2004) and incorporate some of the intuitions put
forward by Kormendi and Protopapadakis (2004): we investigate both real and
nominal bond yields, and do not restrict our attention to them, but also explore the
27The size of this second sample is rather small, and this surely affect the quality of estimates:
yet we are looking for preliminary clues, rather than exact relations and so this admittedly rough
evidence can furnish us with some guidance
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potential impact of fiscal imbalances on the current account, which should work as
the main equilibrating mechanism if capital is fully mobile. In the case of the EMU,
while there are virtually no residual barriers to capital mobility between member
states and the rest of the world, a significant degree of portfolio home bias still
remains, which makes the degree of openness somehow opaque. Then we can expect
that if deficit neutrality is violated, both the interest rate and the current account
would bare some responsibility of adjustment.
5.1 Quarterly data
In this first part of the analysis we exploit quarterly data for the EMU area as a
whole published by the OECD. The data span the period between the first quarter
of 1980 and the second of 2004 for a total of 98 observations. We have opted for the
simplest possible specification, and therefore the basic estimating equation take the
form:
Y LDt = ϕ0 + ϕ1t + ϕ2
surplus
GDPt
+ ϕ3
debtt
GDPt
(2)
where Y LD is an average real (nominal) yield on long-term bonds issued by EMU
area governments, t is a time trend and surplus the primary balance28. As a robust-
ness check we introduce a second measure of the fiscal position specifically aimed at
capturing the non-anticipated part of the fiscal stance. This variable, which appear
as fiscal in the tables, is constructed following Blanchard (1990),Brunila, Hukki-
nen, and Tujula (1999) and Farina and Tamborini (2002) and basically reports the
fiscal stance net of cyclical effects; in other words it is an indicator of discretionary
fiscal policy.
Its construction is fairly easy: the first step is running a regression of the primary
balance to GDP ratio (PB) on a constant, a time trend and GDP growth ( ˙GDP )
PBt = λ0 + λ1trend + λ2 ˙GDPt ; (3)
then estimated coefficients are used to build a growth adjusted primary balance
(GAPB), which is obtained by inserting the previous period GDP growth rate into
the estimated equation. This variable represent which is the primary balance that
would have prevailed in period t, had the GDP grown at the same rate as in period
t − 1. This is computed as
GAPBt = λˆ0 + λˆ1t + λˆ2 ˙GDPt−1 (4)
while our fiscal stance indicator is simply given by the difference between the
growth adjusted measure and the observed value of the primary balance
fiscalt = GAPBt − PBt−1 .
As it is for surplus, a positive value of fiscal implies a fiscal restriction.
28Hence we expect the coefficient on this variable to be negative as an increase in the primary
balance should lower the borrowing cost faced by the government.
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Table 6 presents results for estimation of equation 2 in levels. The first two
sets of estimated coefficients tell that fiscal imbalances do not have any impact on
real bond yields, regardless of the variable used (either the primary balance or the
measure of discretionary policy a` la Blanchard), whilst the stock of outstanding
debt has a significant effect on the cost of borrowing, most probably via risk premia.
The table then reports results for a new specification in which a dummy for the
EMU is included and interacted with fiscal variables to check the hypothesis that
the introduction of the single currency marks a break in the data so that after
1999 deeper integration of European capital market results in EMU fiscal variables
having a larger impact on bond yields. Interaction terms are indeed significant and
suggest that monetary integration may in fact have increased the importance of
euro-area variables in determining interest rates. In particular, the primary balance
to GDP ratio (interacted with the EMU dummy) is positive, contrary to what theory
suggests, while the stock of debt is negative. The latter interesting result tells that
after 1999 liquidity effects dominate default risk consideration: financial markets
ceased to discriminate among EMU members sovereign issuers and as the amount of
outstanding debt increases, bond yields are pushed down by the increased liquidity
of the securities.
One major caveat applies to these estimates: as unit root tests cannot reject a
null of nonstationarity for most of the variables involved in the regression, results
may be spurious. This suspicion is confirmed by residual-based tests for cointe-
gration29: regression residuals from equation 2 —considered as the cointegrating
relation— are not stationary and therefore point toward the lack of any long-run
equilibrium relation.
To address the issue of nonstationarity we therefore run the same regression in
first differences and display the results in table 7. Estimated coefficients change
dramatically and loose significance: more importantly, the ratio of debt to GDP
now changes sign and gets negative, albeit it is not significant at 10%. Again, the
situation does not improve if we substitute fiscal to surplus. Interacting fiscal
variables with the EMU dummy does not improve the situation much: coefficients
are positive, but not significant, so the inception of the monetary union seems not
to have had a strong impact. A further step consits in augmenting the estimating
equation with the squares of fiscal variables (primary balance and debt to GDP): this
should capture nonlinear effects on bond yields, but again results are not significant.
Thus table 7 tells that bond yields are not determined by fiscal variables.
To check the robustness of our (non-)results we have also analyzed nominal
bond yields. We keep using the differenced form of equation 2 but include inflation
among the explanatory variables30. The first row of table 8 shows that inflation has
a positive impact on bond returns, the primary deficit continues not to exert any
influence on bond yields, while the coefficient of stock of debt is now negative and
significant. This suggest that liquidity effects dominate default risk consideration
29ADF, Phillips-Perron and KPSS tests.
30One would ideally use inflation expectations over the life of the bond; lacking this kind of data
we proxy them with the contemporaneous inflation rate.
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and reverse findings obtained estimating the equation in levels. Also, either when
deficit and debt variables are interacted with the EMU dummy (results are not
significantly different) or their squares are introduced in the equation, the main
message is the same.
A further check is performed by using the difference between the yields on long-
and the short-term bonds as the LHS variable. While this should eliminate some
noise from the data, there is the drawback of the limited time span for which the
short-term interest rate is available and that results in only 57 available observations.
Results (not reported) are not satisfactory as no explanatory variable is significant
and a join F-test cannot reject the null of all the coefficients being equal to zero.
Turning now to the current account, the basic estimating equation becomes:
CABt
GDPt
= ϑ0 + ϑ1t + ϑ2inflation + ϑ3
deficitt
GDPt
+ ϑ4
debtt
GDPt
(5)
where variables have a straightforward interpretation. Table 9 reports estimated
coefficients and standard errors for this specification. Inflation has a negative ef-
fect, as a rise in domestic prices lowers competitiveness and depresses exports; the
debt to GDP ratio is negative but not significant while it is interesting to see how
different measures of the fiscal stance brings about opposite results. The negative
coefficient obtained using the primary deficit becomes positive (and has almost the
same magnitude) when the indicator for discretionary policy is introduced. This
would imply that a fiscal tightening is associated with an increase in bond yields
and therefore runs against theory and common sense.
The issue of nonstationarity emerges also in the case of the current account.
Again, as all the series display a unit root we hypothesize that equation 5 may serve
as a cointegrating relation and test the estimated residuals for unit root. Both ADF
and Phillips-Perron test reject nonstationarity at 10% and therefore lend some credit
to the hypothesis of cointegration. Then however OLS are not adequate and we have
to disregard estimates presented in table 9. We then proceed with the estimation
of equation 5 by dynamic OLS (DOLS) and dynamic GLS (DGLS) as suggested by
Stock and Watson (1993). Unfortunately fiscal variables are not significant and thus
DOLS and DGLS results contradict residual-based tests for cointegration.
5.2 Monthly data
In order to focus on the impact of EMU we now restrict our attention to the period
that followed the introduction of the single currency: to cope with this short time
span we have to resort to monthly observations compiled by the ECB and therefore,
instead of analyzing the impact of public deficits on bond yields, we concentrate
on the issuing activity on part of the public sector (data on fiscal variables only
exist at lower frequencies). This ‘restriction’ has the additional benefit of allowing
for a direct test of the hypothesis that the absorption of saving by the pubic sector
—rather than fiscal variables per se— is what really matters for the determination
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of bond yields. Our baseline specification for the real interest rate and the current
account balance are:
∆Y LDt = γ0 + γ1t + γ2
issuegt
GDPt
+ γ3
issuept
GDPt
+ γ4∆
stockgt
GDPt
+ γ5∆
stockpt
GDPt
(6)
∆
CABt
GDPt
= ψ0 + ψ1t + ψ2
issuegt
GDPt
+ ψ3
issuept
GDPt
+ ψ4∆
stockgt
GDPt
+ ψ5∆
stockpt
GDPt
(7)
where Y LD is the real/nominal yield on a government benchmark bond while
the superscripts g and p identify for the public and private sector respectively.
Many variables are nonstationary and thus enter the estimating equation in first
difference. Euro area yields are calculated on the basis of weights corresponding to
nominal outstanding amounts of bonds in each maturity. Real yields are deflated ex
post using the harmonized consumer price index. Our dataset consists of monthly
observations from January 1999 to April 2004 for a total of 64 observations31. We
do not focus on a single maturity but rather use both 3 and 10 year bonds in
order to span the yield curve. This is intended to give some information on the
nature of spillovers: while in fact according to the absorption hypothesis bonds of
all maturities should be affected by an increase in the issuing activity of the public
sector, the spillover would occur only at longer time horizons were the driving force
to be credit risk. Interpretation of equations 6 and 7 is straightforward: under the
‘standard’ view either the real rate or the current account balance should be affected
by the absorption of resources by the public and the private sector. In addition, the
basic equations are augmented with the introduction of GDP growth32 that should
capture responses of the interest rate (and of the current account) to the business
cycle, while when nominal yields are used on the LHS, CPI inflation is added to the
regressors.
Tables 10 and 11 report results for real yields on 3 and 10 year benchmark govern-
ment bonds. The first set of parameter estimates and t-statistics refer to equation 6,
while the last two columns report estimation results when GDP growth is included.
Durbin-Watson statistics suggest the presence of autocorrelation among the residu-
als: this is confirmed by Ljung-Box Q test and has lead us to compute Newey-West
HAC standard errors, from which t-stats are computed. As one would expect, the
short-term yield is more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations represented by GDP
growth; interestingly, something similar occurs to the stock of private debt which
also has a positive impact on bond yields once GDP growth is included. During
economic upturns interest rates go up and as the private sector increases its stock
of debt, corporate bonds will bear a higher risk premium that pushes up returns.
This, combined with return-seeking behavior on part of investors (typical of eco-
nomic growth phases) may explain why a higher stock of private debt spills over to
government benchmark bonds: in order to attract savers, public securities have to
offer a higher return to cope with what happens on the corporate bond market. In
31Data are taken from the ECB Monthly Bulletin, which is the reference for more information
on the data.
32Derived from interpolated quarterly data.
27
sum, table 10 and 11 suggest that at shorter maturities it is as if private and public
debt are less segmented due to the risk seeking behavior of investors. This effect is
much less pronounced at longer horizons: table 11 in fact show that neither GDP
growth nor the stock of private debt are significant at 5%. Bond issue to GDP as
well is not significantly different from zero at all maturities.
Turning now to nominal yields, tables 12 and 13 display a similar (and stronger)
pattern. Inflation has a positive impact on bond yields and the stock of private
debt is strongly significant regardless of the inclusion of GDP growth. Table 13 in
particular displays t-statistics that are much larger than those reported before and
variables are often almost significant: the issuing activity of has a positive impact
on the yield while the negative sign of the stock of public debt points toward the
prevalence of a liquidity effect whereby the return on bonds is lowered by an in-
creased marketability. The fact that government issue gains significance in the 10
year segment would suggest that the impact of public deficits on bond yield works
through default risk rather than absorption of saving. In fact, given current credit
ratings, the likelihood of default is very limited for all EMU members and fiscal im-
balances probably affect only marginally default probabilities, and only long-term
ones. On the contrary, the excess supply phenomenon associated with an issuer
absorbing a significant share of saving should impact bond yields across the whole
maturity spectrum.
Table 14 reports results obtained testing equation 7, where the dependent vari-
able is the current account balance as a share of GDP. Kormendi and Protopapadakis
(2004) maintain that in an open economy framework, any effect of public deficits
on interest rates is not backed by any theory; rather, one would expect the current
account balance to move, as the economy should attract foreign capital to finance
its deficit. Hence, many of the studies that do not find any support for the standard
crowding-out hypothesis may fail because they look in the wrong direction. Unfor-
tunately, results are very poor, estimated coefficients never different from zero and
the negative values for the adjusted R2 summarize the inadequacy of the model.
Moreover, a joint F-test does not reject the null hypothesis of all the coefficients
being equal to zero. Thus, the absorption of resources by either the private or the
public sector does not appear to have any impact on the current account balance.
Overall, the empirical analysis does not provide much credit to the hypothesis
that the fiscal position of the euro area as a whole affects either bond yields or the
current account. This is consistent with recent evidence put forward by Breedon,
Henry, and Williams (1999), Chinn and Frankel (2003), Kormendi and Protopa-
padakis (2004) and Ardagna, Caselli, and Lane (2004). On the other hand, the
results obtained in the case of 10 year bonds (tables 11 and 13) may be read as a
sign that at longer maturities some sort of linkage exists between public finances
and real interest rates. Hence the relevant channel would be credit risk, which can
be expected to affect (albeit marginally) only long-term contracts given the low
probability of any EMU member country defaulting on its debt in the near future.
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Analysis of current account data appears to be dominated by noise. The specifi-
cation chosen for the analysis, which is consistent with theory and is consistent with
other works on the issue (see for instance Kormendi and Protopapadakis (2004))
finds not support in the data and the main message is one of no relation between
fiscal stock and flow variables and the current account balance. There are a number
of possible explanations for this result: first the EMU is not exactly a small player in
international capital market so that it poorly fits a theoretical framework designed
to fit the small country case, second capital market may not be perfectly integrated,
especially when we consider interaction with extra-EMU countries, so that bond
returns differentials are not eliminated by arbitrage.
6 Linkages among EMU member states
This section goes deeper in the empirical analysis by narrowing the focus on the
linkages among government bonds issued by EMU members. Recently there has
been a surge of interest on the dynamics of European government bonds market33.
The latter is often regarded as the most important financial market, as government
securities do not merely represent the dominant financial instrument in European
portfolios (Pere´e and Steinherr 2001), but rather perform a number of tasks related
to the economic well–being of the society (Gravelle 1999). Moreover, different au-
thors agree in identifying the bond market as the financial market segment that has
more promptly reacted to the inception of the EMU and that has most remarkably
integrated to form a single pan–European market.
Most studies focus on spreads among securities issued by different European
states, trying to detect their main determinants now that, with the elimination of
exchange rate risk, segmentation should decline and assets become closer substitutes.
In presence of spillovers, however, it is not possible to assess whether spreads reflect
correctly priced risks and so the strategy has to be adjusted34.
Codogno, Favero, and Missale (2003) investigate the behavior of relative asset
swap spreads (RAS) with respect to Germany; RAS defined as the difference between
the bond yield spread and the spread on swap rates of the same maturity, represent
the component of the yield differential not related to exchange rate factors and thus
allow the authors to pool together data for both the period before and after 1999.
Empirical evidence suggests that international risk factors dominate liquidity, while
no role is played by different debt to GDP ratios.
Hartman, Maddaloni, and Manganelli (2003) agree on the point that remaining
33See among others Lemmen and Goodhart (1999), Lønning (2000), Camarero, Ordon˜ez, and
Tamarit (2003), Hartman, Maddaloni, and Manganelli (2003), Codogno, Favero, and Missale
(2003), Bernoth, von Hagen, and Schuknecht (2004), Dunne, Moore, and Portes (2003), Afonso
and Strauch (2004), Piga and Valente (2004)).
34If the interest rate faced by a country depends on all other EMU countries’ behavior it is not
possible to assess whether a lower yield spread between, say Italian and German bonds depends
on the strengthening of the Italian fiscal fundamentals, or rather on the effect of a weak Italian
position on German yields (or on a mixture of the two effects).
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spreads cannot be explained by credit risk differentials and judge the fact that
prices of bonds with identical ratings have not fully converged as a legacy of market
segmentation. According to their view, this hypothesis is backed up by the fact that
quantity-based indicators show a still significant home-bias in European portfolios
(though it has diminished after the introduction of the signle currency).
Afonso and Strauch (2004) study the impact of 2002 fiscal policy events on
default risk (measured by the spread between the swap rate and the yield on bonds
of the same maturity). They use daily data for the same year and their findings
witness to the lack of a strong reaction. This is consistent with the interpretation
that with current credit ratings default risk is negligible for almost all EMU member
countries and therefore corroborates our decision to disregard this channel.
Dunne, Moore, and Portes (2003) analyze interactions among German, French
and Italian bonds. They exploit two different techniques to look for a benchmark
security, i.e. the instrument to which the price of other securities react. First,
focusing on short-term dynamics, they use a VAR in levels and find that in the
long-term segment of the market the return on Italian securities Granger-causes the
yield on German and French ones, but highlight potential problems in their dataset
(they use intra-day data, so that most actively traded securities may appear to
Granger-cause other assets suffering from the stale price problem). Therefore they
address long-term equilibrium relations exploiting cointegration analysis and find
that German bonds emerge as the benchmark.
6.1 Linkages across bond yields
Figure 6 plots the yields on 10 year government bonds for the 11 countries that
joined EMU in 1999: the graph spans the period between January 1990 and June
2004 and displays monthly averages of long-term bond yields 35. Two facts emerge:
first, a dramatic convergence process took place between 1995 and 1997 and was
almost completed before the actual introduction of the single currency; second, it
is clear that yields on bonds issued by different European countries move together.
This is striking since 1999, but even at the beginning of the sample there was a
marked tendency to co-move.
Does this imply the existence of financial spillovers? Not necessarily: according
to Dunne, Moore, and Portes (2003) and their definition of the benchmark asset,
we need to distinguish financial spillovers from long-term equilibrium relations that
link different financial instruments in the same market. Empirically, this entails
addressing short-term dynamics rather than long-term analysis, i.e. taking the op-
posite route from Dunne, Moore, and Portes (2003). This is consistent with what
suggested by Favero (2001), who notes that in recent research VARs in levels rather
35A legend is missing from the figure as distinguishing 11 series in a black and white plot is
a desperate task, therefore we decide to skip it altogether; note, however, that knowing which is
which makes absolutely no difference for our discussion and thus we prefer to plot all the series
in order to get a complete picture rather than presenting only a selection of countries that would
grant a neater graph.
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than Vector Error Correction Models are used when the focus is on short-run dynam-
ics, regardless the presence of nonstationary variables and cointegrating relations.
The first halt in our search for financial spillovers is then a VAR in levels with
subsequent Granger-causality tests. We concentrate on the period that followed the
introduction of the euro as spillovers should emerge more clearly once exchange rate
risk is eliminated; we exploit a dataset comprising daily observations on 10 year
bond yields from January 2001 to June 2004. Results (not presented and available
upon request) show that Granger-causality is never rejected for all variables and all
equations and suggest that there is in fact co-determination of bond yields.
This being established, we are left with the main part of the problem yet un-
solved: we need to determine the source of such interactions among government
securities. The negative financial spillover hypothesis suggests that at least part
of the co-movements are due to externalities stemming from the fiscal position of
EMU member states. Theory therefore provides us with some guidance and directs
our analysis toward the potential impact of domestic fiscal imbalances on foreign
interest rates.
6.2 The role of fiscal policy
Our first move at this point is collecting a set of auction dates for Italian 10 years
bonds: these are auctioned once a month following a predetermined calendar. We
then build a dummy variable that simply takes value 1 in correspondence of auction
days and zero otherwise and add it to the VAR specification, both in linear form
and interacted with the issue size. Not surprisingly, this first attempt yields no
interesting results. Even after interacting the dummy with the amount of securities
auctioned that day, results are very poor (the dummy variable is significant only
once, namely in the equation describing the Dutch bond yield). As auction dates
follow a predetermined calendar and issuing institutions are more and more careful
not to flood the market with unwanted securities (the amount actually allocated to
investors falls short of demand in all occurrences we observed), one could expect
auctions dates and sizes not to be good proxies of the absorption effect determined
by fiscal imbalances.
In order to analyze the impact of fiscal variables on bond yields, it is necessary
to move to lower frequencies. In what follows we will once again exploit both
quarterly and monthly data. These are still rather high frequencies in terms of fiscal
indicators and we are going to pay a cost in terms of available series (and maybe their
reliability). On the other hand the time span on which we can concentrate is not very
large and these data allow us to maximize the number of available observations36.
Our empirical specification draws from recent works on the topic, especially
Afonso and Strauch (2004), Bernoth, von Hagen, and Schuknecht (2004) and Ardagna,
Caselli, and Lane (2004)37. The latter is especially interesting as it develops a very
36A large part of our analysis is driven, if not constrained, by data availability considerations.
37Ardagna, Caselli, and Lane (2004) test for the existence of a structural break in the relation
between fiscal variables and bond yields for EMU countries due to the inception of the monetary
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simple and basic framework to analyze the relation between fiscal variables and
bond yields. We have explored a number of different specifications, but decided to
concentrate here on one similar to that used in section 5 in order to be consistent
throughout the paper.
Thus our basic specification reads
rasi = β0 + β1 ∗ trend + β2 ∗ int3m + β3 ∗ infl + β4 ∗
[
surplus
gdp
]i
+
+ β5 ∗
[
debt
gdp
]i
+ +β6 ∗
[
surplus
gdp
]emu−i
+ β7 ∗
[
debt
gdp
]emu−i
. (8)
On the left hand side we have the 10 year relative asset swap with respect to
Switzerland. In choosing this as the dependent variable we have followed Codogno,
Favero, and Missale (2003): this cleans bond yields from exchange rate risk and
therefore allows one to pool together data coming before and after the introduction
of the euro. Investigating the presence of financial spillovers among EMU mem-
ber countries, we are forced to look for a reference country that is not part of the
monetary union: we have opted for Switzerland as it is small enough not to exert
particular influences on European-wide government bond markets and its histori-
cal record is one of remarkable stability and sound fiscal position (the return on
Swiss bonds is always lower than that paid on other European securities). In addi-
tion, Switzerland has not experience any significant change in its budgetary position
(contrary for instance to the US, which would represent another natural point of
reference) and this is another reason that makes it an excellent benchmark country.
Moreover, we can feel sufficiently safe in assuming that the fiscal position of any
EMU member state will not influence the yield on Swiss bond as the traditional
neutrality of the latter country results in looser linkages with neighboring nations.
The list of controls included in equation 8 comprises the 3 month interest rate,
inflation, domestic and foreign primary surplus38 and debt to GDP ratios. The su-
perscript i stands for the countries object of our study, namely France, Germany,
Italy and the Netherlands, while the label EMU − i indicates the aggregated fiscal
position of the other 11 EMU member countries. We have chosen to aggregate for-
eign fiscal variables in order to avoid potential collinearity problems 39. All variables
as measured as deviation from the relevant Swiss variable. Data are taken from the
OECD Economic Outlook except for swap rates which come from Datastream; the
availability of this latter variable constitutes the main constraint on the analysis as
for most countries swap rates are only reported starting in the early nineties. Given
union. They do not find any support for the hypothesis that the relative importance of national
versus world fiscal policy variables have changed as a result to the new monetary regime.
38We have chosen not to use the indicator of discretionary fiscal stance a` la Blanchard (1990)
because the first stage fit needed to compute the sensitivity of the primary balance to GDP growth
is extremely poor and therefore our estimates very imprecise.
39A previous version of the paper used disaggregated variables for the four relevant countries.
Results were dominated by noise regardless of whether we used the primary balance or the measure
of the fiscal stance proposed by Blanchard (1990).
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that available fiscal indicators are at quarterly frequency, we are left with less than
60 observations (actually between 51 and 56)40.
All variables (apart from the 3 month interest rate) display a unit root, so we
cannot simply proceed with estimation of the SUR in levels. We first tackle the
problem by differencing all nonstationary variables: table 15 reports the results for
such specification. Unfortunately none of the control is significant, nor does the
inclusion of the squares of the fiscal variables help to improve the situation much.
In table 16 we present the results for a specification in which the foreign fiscal
variables are interacted with a dummy for EMU. In this way we can directly test
the hypothesis that with the introduction of the single currency the fiscal position
of other EMU member countries has gained importance. Yet, the last two rows
of the table show that the relevant coefficients are significant in some cases (above
all Italy), though the surplus coefficients display the wrong sign (so that a larger
primary balance would result in a higher interest rate).
Alternatively, we test the hypothesis that equation 8 represent a long-run equi-
librium relation and therefore test I(1) variables for cointegration. Residual-based
tests on the 4 equations of the SUR give conflicting results: it is possible to reject
the null of unit root (equivalent to no cointegration) for residuals of the equation
for Italy, France and the Netherlands at 5, 10 and 12.5% respectively, while this
hypothesis cannot be rejected in the case of Germany. Nontheless we have decided
to keep the 4 equations together and estimate the whole SUR by DGLS. Results are
reported in table 17: many coefficients are now significantly different from zero, but
signs often change when we move from one equation (country) to another and it is
frankely difficult to tell a clear pattern in the results.
The fact that every country reacts differently to changes in its own fiscal posi-
tion and in that of other countries may be read as a clue that financial markets can
efficiently discriminate among different borrowers. Thus each country faces a cost
of borrowing that depends on the status it enjoys on financial markets and on other
characteristics of its economic system.
In order to test for the absorption effect mentioned by Kenen (1995) we shift out
attention to bond issues rather than primary balance to GDP ratios. Stock variables
continue to appear in our analysis as they proxy for market depth and hence for
liquidity.
In what follows we restrict our attention to Italy and Germany as their Central
Banks publish monthly series for the amount of securities issued by the central
government and their total outstanding stock. Data are taken from the statistical
annexes of the monthly publications of the Banca d’Italia and the Bundesbank. The
estimating equation is not very different from the previous one, although it is now
refined and adapted to the new dataset:
40In a previous version of the paper we had interpolated the series and transformed them to
monthly. Results were very poor and we therefore decided to abandon that route.
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We continue to use the RAS with respect to Switzerland as our dependent vari-
able in order to be able to clean our data from exchange rate risk and thus maximize
the length of the dataset. Superscripts i and j represent Italy or Germany: now we
have a bidimensional system, which we again estimate by means of a SUR. Despite
the fact that we have to focus on only two countries, we believe that they represent
a significant sample in our search for financial spillovers. Germany is the leading
economy in the euro area and its securities have long served as benchmark in the
bond market; Italy, on the other hand is both a large country (with respect to EMU),
is characterized by a very large stock of debt and is traditionally viewed as a ‘non
virtuous’ country. The RAS and the total stock of debt to GDP are nonstationary
and therefore enter equation 9 in first differences. The regression is run using both
3 and 10 year securities in order to see whether different maturities display different
behaviors.
Table 18 reports results for estimation of equation 9 : coefficients on bond issues
and stocks are barely significant, so that once again we do not find much support for
the idea that by absorbing a larger share of European savings each government can
rise the overall cost of borrowing. The signs of the coefficients suggest that while
Germany may suffer a limited degree of spillover stemming from the Italian issuing
activity, the opposite does not hold. On the contrary, an increase in the stock of Ital-
ian debt has a negative impact on both the Italian and the German yield, signaling
the presence of liquidity effects. Yet, the fact that for Germany the coefficients of
foreign variables are significant while those on domestic ones are not, suggests some
caution in the interpretation of these results. The finding that only Italian variables
appear to matter (albeit marginally) lends credit to the view that financial markets
are indeed able to discriminate among different issuers so that the same action taken
by different actors have dissimilar results depending on the identity of the debtor.
Hence the privileged status enjoyed by German securities would grant less stringent
limits to the public finances of the Bundesrepublik, while the fact that Italy has one
of the world largest public debt implies closer surveillance by market participants.
This is reminiscent of the results by Flandreau, Le Cacheaux, and Zumer (1998)
according to whom financial markets behave in nonlinear ways and only beyond a
given threshold do borrowers start feeling the bite of market discipline.
To explore this intuition in more detail we have added the squares of bond issues
and debt stocks to the estiating equation, but the picture does not change. Also,
we have interacted them with a dummy for EMU, but again these new controls are
not significant. Another attempt to improve the fit of the equation (and the results)
consists of augmenting equation 9 along the line of Afonso and Strauch (2004). Table
19 shows the outcome of the empirical analysis when we include among the regressors
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the slope of the yield curve and a measure of stock market volatility. The former,
which is measured by the difference between the yield on 10 year government bonds
and the 3 month Euribor, captures future growth expectations: a steeper slope
reduces the risk of private relative to government securities, and therefore pushes up
the cost of borrowing for the government. On the contrary, the standard deviation
of daily return on the S&P500 index proxies for stock market risk and is supposed to
reduce the return required by investors. The table highlights that such modifications
do not produce any improvement in the results and gives us some confidence in the
fact that our (negative) findings are not driven by the particular specification chosen
for the analysis.
7 Conclusion
The paper has investigated the presence of negative financial spillovers among euro
area government bond yields and their relations with fiscal imbalances. While re-
turns on assets issued by different European governments do show a large degree of
comovements, little evidence emerges to relate this common dynamics to the fiscal
positions of EMU members.
The paper reviews a number of open economy models, focusing in particular on
the predictions about the effect of a fiscal expansion on the international rate of
interest. Theory does not provide clear cut indications: not only different models
give different outcomes, but even modifying a single assumption can lead the same
model to reverse its predictions. Hence the issue of fiscal spillovers remains an
empirical question.
Evidence from two major historical episodes does not offer much credit to the
spillover hypothesis. We have analyzed the impact of German unification and the
Italian fiscal crisis of the early nineties on European interest rates. The former in
particular represents a large shift in the fiscal and external position of the leading
European economy. We therefore expect this to result in a sensible movement in the
cost of borrowing faced by other countries as capital started flowing into Germany to
finance unification. Moreover, uncover interest parity suggests that in presence of a
pegged but adjustable exchange rate, spillover effects should be magnified by depre-
ciation expectations. Contrary to predictions though, evidence offers little support
to the spillover hypothesis and shows that in both instances the fiscal deterioration
affected only domestic interest rates.
The negative financial spillover hypothesis takes for granted that a relation exists,
linking domestic fiscal variables and interest rates. To gather some evidence on the
topic we have investigated whether the fiscal position of the euro area as a whole
has any impact on the average yield on European government bonds. Econometric
analysis does not highlight any significant relation between the fiscal stance and
the interest rate and therefore adds to the number of studies that postulates the
neutrality of fiscal variables with respect to the cost of borrowing.
In the last part of the paper we have directly examined the behavior of bonds
issued by (some) EMU member governments. We have used a number of different
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specifications and considered both fiscal variables and bond issues in order to directly
test the absorption hypothesis. Results are less clear cut but overall it appears that
neither fiscal imbalances, nor issuance activities have the direct negative impact on
interest rates postulated in the SGP.
More work remains to be done in order to understand the role played by factors
other than the fiscal variables in determining the strong comovements displayed by
European bond yields. In particular, it would be interesting to incorporate more
sophisticated measures of liquidity in the picture and check whether this can explain
at least part of the phenomenon.
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Tables
Table 1: German fiscal position: summary statistics
Period averages
debt current financial
growth rate deficit account account
1985 to 1989 5.88% 19.66 40.16 -41.73
1986 to 1990 8.46% 23.56 46.08 -48.97
1989 to 1994 15.07% 59.77 -7.92 9.46
1991 to 1995 16.57% 64.23 -22.25 29.19
Data in billion DM. Source: IMF IFS.
Table 2: Impact of German unification on European-wide variables
deficitGer/debtEU† deficitGer/GDPEU‡
1989 0.35% 0.05%
1990 4.03% 0.47%
1991 4.22% 0.67%
1992 4.05% 0.76%
1993 3.68% 0.84%
1994 2.03% 0.46%
1995 2.47% 0.62%
notional limits implied by Maastricht criteria
1.00% 1.00%
†EMU 11 save for Ireland and Portugal
‡EMU 11
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Table 3: Yield on German and European bonds
Months before and after unification
1 3 6 12 18 24 36
Germany before 8.96 8.73 7.60 6.90 6.35 6.21 5.60
after 8.64 9.21 8.95 8.50 8.51 8.28 6.62
Europe†: GDP weighted before 11.18 11.35 10.53 9.98 9.44 9.38 9.47
after 10.96 11.47 11.07 10.71 10.37 10.22 8.77
Europe†: trade weighted before 10.67 10.82 10.01 9.37 8.83 8.82 8.86
after 10.46 10.99 10.61 10.23 9.96 9.79 8.25
†Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, UK.
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Table 4: Spread vis-a`-vis German yield
Months before and after unification
1 3 6 12 18 24 36
Austria before -0.15 0.02 0.25 0.27 0.18 0.41 1.02
after 0.07 -0.23 -0.15 0.03 0.14 0.32 0.28
Belgium before 0.89 1.18 2.07 1.50 1.70 1.63 2.22
after 0.96 1.34 1.03 0.87 0.51 0.62 0.37
France before 0.66 1.24 1.54 1.79 2.27 2.73 3.72
after 0.97 1.31 0.98 0.65 0.28 0.46 0.50
Ireland before 0.98 1.70 1.68 2.06 2.06 3.40 5.33
after 0.88 1.35 0.94 0.74 0.34 0.59 0.87
Italy before 2.57 2.82 3.84 3.94 3.67 3.91 3.89
after 2.69 2.22 2.86 4.59 4.45 4.83 5.26
Luxembourg before -0.45 -0.24 0.74 0.38 -0.21 0.23 2.54
after -0.22 -0.64 -0.42 -0.28 -0.41 -0.36 0.37
Netherlands before -0.01 0.25 0.15 0.30 0.15 0.31 0.68
after 0.10 -0.05 0.11 0.14 0.21 0.02 -0.03
Portugal before 9.51 9.65 10.23 8.27 7.60 7.53 9.64
after 9.90 9.65 9.83 9.87 8.62 6.82 7.90
Spain before 5.67 6.13 6.89 6.88 6.47 4.65 7.60
after 5.81 5.93 5.59 3.42 3.36 3.42 3.72
Switzerland before -2.64 -2.15 -1.85 -1.78 -2.12 -2.07 -1.49
after -2.56 -2.67 -2.27 -2.52 -2.16 -1.30 -2.08
UK before 2.53 2.73 2.36 2.98 3.10 3.11 3.30
after 2.39 2.11 1.47 1.84 1.05 0.74 1.77
Data for Finland not available
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Table 5: Development of Italian public finances
Percentage of GDP
primary interest
deficit debt balance payments
1970 -4.82% 34.13% -1.00% 0.78%
1971 -6.56% 38.28% -1.52% 0.96%
1972 -7.39% 42.51% -2.13% 1.18%
1973 -8.30% 43.91% -1.89% 1.35%
1974 -7.42% 43.96% -1.95% 1.70%
1975 -12.10% 49.82% -3.36% 2.46%
1976 -8.43% 48.71% -2.84% 2.87%
1977 -10.37% 51.27% -2.35% 3.17%
1978 -13.52% 57.01% -2.76% 3.81%
1979 -9.81% 56.56% -2.61% 3.74%
1980 -9.55% 54.83% -1.36% 4.02%
1981 -11.49% 57.65% -3.85% 4.52%
1982 -13.39% 62.84% -2.85% 6.17%
1983 -13.93% 68.25% -2.20% 7.53%
1984 -12.95% 71.82% -3.32% 8.06%
1985 -14.59% 78.92% -4.52% 8.08%
1986 -11.95% 83.33% -3.04% 8.27%
1987 -11.27% 87.76% -2.81% 7.58%
1988 -11.14% 90.39% -2.19% 8.05%
1989 -10.72% 93.31% -1.94% 8.98%
1990 -10.49% 95.39% -1.14% 9.92%
1991 -10.17% 98.01% -0.26% 11.30%
1992 -10.73% 105.11% 0.95% 12.16%
1993 -10.09% 112.94% 1.87% 12.59%
Source: IMF IFS and OECD Economic Outlook.
Table 6: Impact of fiscal variables on real long-term yield: quarterly data
Dependent Variable: real yield on long-term bonds
Method: Least Squares
Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat
surplus/gdp -0.051 -0.197 -0.229 -0.394
fiscal/gdp -0.094 -0.355
debt/gdp 0.153 2.504 0.134 2.292 -0.068 -0.580
(deficit/gdp)2
(debt/gdp)2
emu ∗ deficit/gdp 1.136 1.777
emu ∗ debt/gdp -0.079 -2.788
Observations 98 97 98
Adjusted R2 0.263 0.277 0.394
Constant and time trend not shown
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors
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Table 7: Impact of fiscal variables on real long-term yield: quarterly data
Dependent Variable: real yield on long-term bonds — 1st difference
Method: Least Squares
Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat
∆surplus/gdp -0.149 -0.493 -0.380 -0.750 0.043 0.161
∆fiscal/gdp -0.267 -0.735
∆debt/gdp -0.203 -1.431 -0.208 -1.551 -0.268 -1.342 -0.016 -0.109
∆(deficit/gdp)2 0.647 1.157
∆(debt/gdp)2 -0.186 -1.324
emu ∗ ∆deficit/gdp 0.582 1.084
emu ∗ ∆debt/gdp 0.303 1.135
Observations 97 96 97 97
Adjusted R2 0.057 0.066 0.061 0.065
Constant and time trend not shown
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors
Table 8: Impact of fiscal variables on nominal long-term yield: quarterly data
Dependent Variable: nominal yield on long-term bonds — 1st difference
Method: Least Squares
Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat
∆inflation 0.461 2.607 0.440 2.544 0.461 2.723
∆surplus/gdp -0.119 -0.368 -0.407 -0.784 0.079 0.270
∆debt/gdp -0.304 -2.114 -0.374 -1.901 -0.120 -0.761
∆(deficit/gdp)2 0.690 1.235
∆(debt/gdp)2 -0.178 -1.287
emu ∗ ∆deficit/gdp 0.712 1.328
emu ∗ ∆debt/gdp 0.323 1.194
Observations 97 98 98
Adjusted R2 0.181 0.195 0.191
Constant and time trend not shown
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors
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Table 9: Impact of fiscal variables on the current account: quarterly data
Dependent Variable: current account to gdp
Method: Least Squares
Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat
inflation -0.382 -7.991 -0.392 -8.458
surplus/gdp -0.213 -3.090
fiscal/gdp 0.230 2.972
debt/gdp 0.019 0.914 0.017 0.812
Observations 98 97
Adjusted R2 0.645 0.652
Constant and time trend not shown
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors
Table 10: Impact of fiscal variables on real 3-year yield
Dependent Variable: real yield on 3 year bonds — 1st difference
Method: Least Squares
Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat
(issueg/gdp) 0.039 0.817 0.018 0.375
(issuep/gdp) 0.024 0.380 0.014 0.260
∆(stockg/gdp) -0.041 -0.671 -0.024 -0.480
∆(stockp/gdp) 0.054 1.459 0.079 2.470
gdp growth 0.051 2.779
Observations 63 63
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.077
Constant and time trend not shown
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors
Table 11: Impact of fiscal variables on real 10-year yield
Dependent Variable: real yield on 10 year bonds — 1st difference
Method: Least Squares
Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat
(issueg/gdp) 0.059 1.161 0.048 0.912
(issuep/gdp) 0.033 0.602 0.028 0.569
∆(stockg/gdp) -0.038 -0.588 -0.028 -0.476
∆(stockp/gdp) 0.034 0.975 0.048 1.730
gdp growth 0.029 1.379
Observations 63 63
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.029
Constant and time trend not shown
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors
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Table 12: Impact of fiscal variables on nominal 3-year yield
Dependent Variable: nominal yield on 3 year bonds — 1st difference
Method: Least Squares
Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat
∆inflation 0.129 1.257 0.153 1.631
(issueg/gdp) 0.038 1.015 0.021 0.556
(issuep/gdp) -0.068 -1.019 -0.074 -1.159
∆(stockg/gdp) -0.057 -1.356 -0.043 -1.032
∆(stockp/gdp) 0.085 2.158 0.104 2.617
gdp growth 0.041 2.341
Observations 63 63
Adjusted R2 0.112 0.191
Constant and time trend not shown
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors
Table 13: Impact of fiscal variables on nominal 10-year yield
Dependent Variable: nominal yield on 10 year bonds — 1st difference
Method: Least Squares
Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat
∆inflation 0.115 1.691 0.126 1.996
(issueg/gdp) 0.058 1.817 0.050 1.593
(issuep/gdp) -0.060 -1.404 -0.062 -1.524
∆(stockg/gdp) -0.054 -1.387 -0.047 -1.322
∆(stockp/gdp) 0.066 2.392 0.074 2.597
gdp growth 0.019 1.567
Observations 63 63
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.125
Constant and time trend not shown
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors
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Table 14: Impact of fiscal variables on the current account
Dependent Variable: current account to GDP — 1st difference
Method: Least Squares
Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat
issue/GDPgov -0.013 -0.378 -0.017 -0.459
issue/GDPpvt -0.004 -0.093 -0.005 -0.152
∆(stock/GDPgov) 0.013 0.318 0.016 0.389
∆(stock/GDPpvt) 0.006 0.221 0.010 0.439
GDP growth 0.009 0.579
Observations 63 63
Adjusted R2 -0.083 -0.097
Constant and time trend not shown
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors
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Table 15: Impact of domestic and foreign fiscal variables on yields
Dependent Variable: 10 year asset swap relative to Switzerland— 1st difference
Method: SUR
France Germany Italy Netherlands
Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat
3month rate -0.034 -2.57 -0.024 -1.332 -0.006 -0.329 -0.047 -2.33
∆inflation 0.013 0.549 0.017 1.455 -0.107 -1.618 -0.005 -0.367
∆
[
surplus
gdp
]
domestic
-0.011 -0.359 0.013 0.467 0.009 0.28 -0.004 -0.186
∆
[
debt
gdp
]
domestic
-0.012 -0.382 0.01 0.609 -0.009 -0.434 -0.004 -0.319
∆
[
surplus
gdp
]
foreign
-0.002 -0.043 0.005 0.135 -0.098 -1.126 0.016 0.366
∆
[
debt
gdp
]
foreign
0.028 0.94 -0.018 -0.86 -0.079 -1.593 -0.019 -0.697
Observations 50 55 53 51
Adjusted R2 -0.079 -0.115 0.030 -0.113
Constant and trend not shown
Table 16: Domestic and foreign fiscal variables & EMU dummy
Dependent Variable: 10 year asset swap relative to Switzerland— 1st difference
Method: SUR
France Germany Italy Netherlands
Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat
3month rate -0.039 -2.863 -0.040 -2.021 -0.020 -1.148 -0.054 -2.588
∆inflation 0.008 0.307 0.010 0.847 -0.091 -1.403 -0.009 -0.622
∆
[
surplus
gdp
]
domestic
0.014 0.373 0.080 1.912 0.118 2.510 -0.011 -0.506
∆
[
debt
gdp
]
domestic
-0.009 -0.266 0.019 1.056 -0.017 -0.880 -0.005 -0.352
∆
[
surplus
gdp
]
foreign
-0.032 -0.608 -0.061 -1.194 -0.331 -2.990 0.008 0.182
∆
[
debt
gdp
]
foreign
0.023 0.783 -0.020 -0.941 -0.080 -1.737 -0.022 -0.845
∆EMU ∗
[
surplus
gdp
]
foreign
0.157 1.265 0.250 1.941 0.813 3.121 0.216 1.720
∆EMU ∗
[
debt
gdp
]
foreign
-0.003 -0.733 -0.007 -1.361 -0.019 -2.892 -0.004 -0.893
Observations 50 55 52 50
Adjusted R2 -0.046 -0.061 0.113 -0.059
Constant and trend not shown
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Table 17: DGLS estimate of the cointegrating relation
Dependent Variable: 10 year asset swap relative to Switzerland
Method: DLGS SUR
France Germany Italy Netherlands
Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat
3month rate -0.051 -4.702 -0.077 -3.206 0.011 0.430 -0.121 -3.532
inflation 0.044 2.284 -0.098 -5.208 0.038 0.479 -0.096 -5.325[
surplus
gdp
]
domestic
0.037 1.046 -0.138 -6.283 0.111 1.410 -0.145 -4.140[
debt
gdp
]
domestic
0.209 5.355 0.016 1.143 -0.066 -3.511 -0.130 -8.275[
surplus
gdp
]
foreign
-0.083 -1.970 0.171 7.513 -0.249 -1.641 0.119 3.051[
debt
gdp
]
foreign
-0.178 -4.706 -0.034 -3.904 -0.046 -3.155 0.081 6.431
Observations 49 52 51 49
Adjusted R2 0.759 0.936 0.920 0.815
Constant and trend not shown
Table 18: Impact of bond issues on yields: basic specification
Dependent Variable: 10 and 3 year asset swap relative to Switzerland
Method: SUR
10 years 3 years
Italy Germany Italy Germany
Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat
∆rast−1 -0.131 -1.927 -0.190 -2.984 -0.311 -4.127 -0.352 -5.515
(issue/GDP )ita 0.020 1.550 0.020 1.792 0.024 1.542 0.018 1.491
∆(stock/GDP )ita -0.008 -0.896 -0.010 -1.764 -0.016 -1.428 -0.017 -1.984
(issue/GDP )ger -0.015 -0.673 -0.010 -0.737 -0.003 -0.101 -0.004 -0.205
∆(stock/GDP )ger 0.015 0.818 0.020 1.429 -0.002 -0.105 0.009 0.532
Observations 159 170 136 170
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.082 0.061 0.157
Constant and trend not shown
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Table 19: Impact of bond issues on yields: augmented specification
Dependent Variable: 10 and 3 year asset swap relative to Switzerland
Method: SUR
10 years 3 years
Italy Germany Italy Germany
Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat
∆rast−1 -0.14 -2.063 -0.184 -2.937 -0.314 -4.139 -0.354 -5.556
∆slpt 0.024 0.393 0.053 1.254 0.008 0.107 0.085 1.500
S&P500volatility 4.922 1.401 0.989 0.409 1.892 0.479 0.869 0.263
(issue/GDP )ita 0.02 1.584 0.016 1.751 0.024 1.516 0.017 1.405
∆(stock/GDP )ita -0.008 -0.921 -0.011 -1.704 -0.015 -1.407 -0.016 -1.887
(issue/GDP )ger -0.015 -0.671 -0.01 -0.637 -0.002 -0.074 -0.002 -0.085
∆(stock/GDP )ger 0.016 0.892 0.016 1.262 -0.002 -0.096 0.006 0.335
Observations 159 170 136 170
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.079 0.047 0.158
Constant and trend not shown
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Figures
Figure 1: Current and financial account for Germany: 1971–1998
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Figures in billion USD. Source: IFS.
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Figure 2: EU† - Germany long-term interest rate differential
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†Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK.
Dot-dashed line represents the difference between the German rate and an average
European rate obtained weighting countries’ yield by relative GDP shares; solid line
repeats the exercise weighting yields by German import shares.
53
Figure 3: Change in money stock in Germany, Italy and the UK
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Figure 4: Money market rate in Germany, Italy and the UK
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Figure 5: Yield on long-term bonds before and after September 1992
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Figure 6: Yield on 10 year government bonds: EMU 11 countries
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